Since the 1962 war, the two countries have concluded various bilateral agreements as confidence-building measures (CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES) to prevent an escalation of the situation, including the high-profile 1996 agreement and the “dominant practice” of not using weapons in the vicinity of lac resulting from this and other agreements. Below, we have described the various bilateral agreements and the authoritative governmental and international sources when they are accessible: The Chinese rightly noted that the Indians were interested in making Rao`s visit a success, and then represented another obstacle. They told the Indian interlocutors that the People`s Liberation Army would need time to be persuaded to clarify the LAC in advance. Menon writes: “The mandarins in the Chinese Foreign Ministry seemed difficult to justify this position, and finally said privately that they had no room for maneuver because the People`s Liberation Army insisted on it.” That is how the agreement was signed. “However, the 1993 agreement created a group of experts from diplomats and military personnel to advise on the direction of the real line of control in resolving disputes between the two sides.” The English text of the Protocol, signed in New Delhi on 11 April 2005, can be found on the bilateral/multilateral documents page of the Media Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India (MEA). A copy and summary of the protocol can also be found in the UN Peacemakers Database and the PA-X Peace Agreement Database. The protocol aims to implement previous agreements and “agreed modalities for the implementation of confidence-building measures, including through procedures for the exchange of information on troop movements and the holding of semi-annual meetings on border issues. They also agreed to resolve any breach of contract or need for clarification through diplomatic channels. Signed in New Delhi on 11 April 2005, available in the database of Chinese DFA contracts in English, Chinese and Hindi. The English text of the agreement can also be found in the Indian Indian Treaty Database in the MEA region. Article 1 states: “Differences on the border issue shall not affect the overall development of bilateral relations. The two sides will resolve the border issue through peaceful and friendly consultations.
The agreement was signed in New Delhi during a state visit by the Chinese president. This was the first visit by a Chinese president to India. [35] The agreement was opened by a reference to the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the 1993 agreement. [3] The twelve articles make it clear that the agreement is a non-war agreement, that the final solution to the border issue remains in place and that the LAC must be respected. It states that military deployment should be limited and details on how to deal with military exercises, air intrusions, overflights and landings of military aircraft near the LAC. It aims to prevent “dangerous military activities” in the vicinity of LAC, covers confidence-building measures such as “flag meetings and telecommunications” and deals with the accidental crossing of LAC. It reiterates that clarification may be sought with regard to the Agreement and LAC, as well as ratification issues. The agreement recognises that there are different perceptions in certain areas along the LAC. [4] [3] In many border incidents, agreements have been respected in order to successfully maintain peace, i.e. to successfully prevent conflicts. [2] [3] [4] Agreements are not solely responsible for this success. Political will and other interests in a peaceful border were also responsible.
[2] On the other hand, the agreements have also been seriously and completely violated on numerous occasions, most recently during the skirmishes between China and India in 2020. [5] The failure to settle the border dispute led to the Sino-Indian War in 1962, and there was no final agreement between the countries on the exact location of the LAC. According to Alyssa Ayres, a South Asia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, “China and India have different ideas about where they should be, which leads to regular border crossings.” Often, these tensions do not escalate; a severe border blockade like the one that currently exists is less common, although it is the fourth since 2013. The June 15 border conflict reportedly occurred during an apparent “de-escalation process,” weeks after “senior military commanders of the two countries” agreed on June 6 to “peacefully resolve the situation in the border areas in accordance with various bilateral agreements.” The clash on the ridge reportedly involved close combat with iron bars, stones and fists, resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers. While neither side carried weapons, most of the soldiers killed in the fighting lost their grip or were pushed back from the narrow Himalayan ridge and plunged to their deaths. These are the first deaths along the LAC since 1975. By decoupling the 1993 agreement with the establishment of the LAC, China has effectively eviscerated the line that has been the border for all intents and purposes for the past 27 years and has been known to the Indian Army as lac. Article 10 of the agreement mentioned the exchange of cards between the two countries. Initially, there had been some progress in card exchange. India and China exchanged cards from the Barahoti sector in the second half of 2000.
In June 2001, the Indian and Chinese sides held the first in-depth discussion on LAC in Sector Central. [36] Sikkim cards were also exchanged. [37] This resulted in the “Memorandum on Border Trade Development.” [37] [38] However, when maps of other sectors were exchanged, particularly the western sector,[39][40][41] perceptions varied greatly to such an extent that the process stopped around 2002/2003. [42] [43] In July 2020, China`s ambassador to India said Beijing was not interested in continuing the card exchange process, which was halted in 2002. [44] One of the drawbacks of the card exchange process was that it “encouraged exaggeration of their assertions about lac`s whereabouts.” [45] Fast forward to 1993. India and China signed the LAC AGREEMENT without demarcation or demarcation (neither on maps nor on the ground) for the sole purpose of maintaining peace and tranquility. Of course, the line that India held for LAC under the 1993 agreement may not have been where the Chinese had said it. Beijing`s point of reference for this was its 1959-60 claim lines.
Signed at Beijing on 23 October 2013. An English text of the agreement can be found in the Indian MEA Media Centre as well as in the UN Peacemakers Database. According to Ankit Panda of The Diplomat, the 10-article agreement lists several mechanisms to reduce misunderstandings and improve communication between the two countries along their disputed border. Article VI expressly prohibits a party from actively following or following patrols of another site. Articles VI, VII and VIII each explicitly describe dispute settlement procedures in “areas where there is no common understanding of the actual line of control”. Given that the Ladakh crisis drags on longer than expected, the hat analogy sums up India`s dilemma. Regardless of how the negotiations between India and China unfold, two harsh realities are obvious: the existing diplomatic framework created by the 1993 Peace and Quiet Agreement to curb volatility along the Line of Effective Control (LAC) has been thrown overboard by China. In addition, the illusion of the Indian Army`s dual-front warfare capability, created in 2009, has been shattered. A reset is required. The first round of border talks took place in December 1981. Negligible progress has been made in the first three rounds of talks.
[15] In the fourth round, it was decided that other areas of relations should be normalised without linking them to border issues. [16] This led to a reduction in tensions to such an extent that during the fifth cycle, the border issue was again tackled head-on, but for many reasons, including domestic incidents such as the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, no final results were achieved. [16] The seventh round in July 1986 took place in the context of the Sumdorong Chu impasse. [17] The eighth cycle eventually led to a visit by the Indian Prime Minister to China in 1988,[17] a visit by the Chinese Prime Minister to India in 1992, and then a visit by the Indian President to China in 1992. . . .
